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COMPARATIVE FAULT AND
THE STRUCTURAL
WORK ACT:
SIMMONS V. UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
With the Illinois Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Coney v. J.L.G.
Industries,' Illinois joined a growing number of states that apply comparative
negligence to offset damages in strict products liability actions. 2 Although
Illinois only recently became a comparative negligence state,3 the court's
extension of the doctrine to strict liability actions followed the lead of the
most progressive courts in the area of comparative negligence. 4 The Coney
1. 97 I1. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
2. Seven states have comparative negligence statutes that specifically provide for the
application of comparative negligence in strict liability actions. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765
(1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-1404 (Supp. 1985); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.2949 (Supp. 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1963-1985).
In addition, numerous states have applied comparative negligence to strict products liability
by judicial decision. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast
Processing, 65 Hawaii 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97 II1. 2d 104, 454
N.E.2d 197 (1983); Kennedy v. Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Zahrte v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17 (Mont. 1983); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802,
395 A.2d 843 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140
(1979); Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co.,
287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984);
Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 682 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski
Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55 (1967).
3. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar, 85 II!.
2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). The decision to adopt comparative negligence was foreshadowed
by one of the court's prior decisions, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70
I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). In Skinner, the court
abandoned the previous rule in Illinois, that prohibited contribution between joint tortfeasors,
and allowed a manufacturer of a product to seek contribution from the plaintiff's employer.
The supreme court stated, "equitable principles require that ultimate liability for plaintiff's
injuries be apportioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the defective product and
the employer's conduct proximately caused them." Id. at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
4. Alaska, California, and Florida are generally considered to be the most progressive
states in the area of comparative negligence; these states were also among the first states to
apply comparative negligence in strict liability actions. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1976).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
court carefully analyzed the policies that underlie the doctrines of compar-
ative negligence and strict products liability, and concluded that comparative
negligence could be applied in strict products liability actions without frus-
trating those policies.'
In contrast to the Coney decision, in Simmons v. Union Electric Co. 6 the
Illinois Supreme Court declined to extend comparative negligence to strict
liability claims under the Illinois Structural Work Act (SWA).7 The SWA
provides a statutory cause of action for workers who are injured on con-
struction sites. Defendants in SWA actions may include owners, contractors,
subcontractors, and other persons in charge of the construction work. Unlike
the situation in Coney, the Simmons court did not have the guidance of
other state decisions in determining whether comparative negligence was
applicable to the SWA.8 While the Coney decision should have provided a
relevant analytical framework, the Simmons court refused to apply that
rationale. Further, the Simmons court improperly treated the doctrine of
comparative negligence as if it were the same as the doctrine of contributory
negligence. The Simmons court based its determination that SWA defendants
could not raise comparative negligence to offset damages solely on older
cases that barred the use of contributory negligence to reduce damages in
SWA cases.
This Note analyzes the Simmons decision. First, this Note examines the
history of the SWA and the doctrine of comparative negligence in Illinois.
Second, this Note criticizes the court's analysis in Simmons and proposes
an alternative analysis that is consistent with the Coney decision. Finally,
this Note assesses the impact that the Simmons decision will have on em-
ployers, owners, and contractors, as well as on the future of the SWA and
comparative negligence in Illinois.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Illinois Structural Work Act
The Illinois Structural Work Act (SWA) 9 was enacted in 1907.0 The SWA
5. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
6. 104 I11. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946 (1984).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1983).
8. For a discussion of other states' statutes, see infra note 9.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1983). Illinois' Structural Work Act sets forth safety
guidelines and grants a civil cause of action to the injured party. Other states have statutes
that set forth safety guidelines similar to those in the Illinois statute but do not create a cause
of action. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 7150-7158 (West 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 7701-
7703 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48, §§ IlI -115 (1982); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 292.090 (Vernon 1965); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-77-101 to -107 (1983); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 48-425, -428, -429 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277:2-5 (1977); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 174 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 4201-4204 (Purdon 1972). Some states have general statutes that cover construction
activities, including scaffolds and related devices. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5-166 to -181
(West 1965 & Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 101.11 (West. 1973 & Supp. 1984-1985). Arizona
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provided for "the protection and safety of persons in and about the con-
struction, repairing, alteration, or removal of buildings, bridges, viaducts,
and other structures, and to provide for enforcement thereof."" The SWA
contains sections that delineate the safety requirements for scaffolds, 2 lad-
ders, 3 joists,' 4 pipes,' 5 towers,' 6 flooring,' 7 and elevators.' 8 The last section
of the SWA sets forth criminal and civil sanctions for violations of the safety
requirements.' 9 Criminal penalties include fines of up to $1,00020 and im-
prisonment for up to one year. 2' Wilful violations of the SWA may also
support private causes of action to compensate the injured parties. 22
The SWA has no recorded legislative history. The purpose of the SWA
can nevertheless be determined by analogizing the act to common law
industrial injury actions that existed at the time that the SWA was adopted.
The act was passed in response to the emerging workplace hazards of
industrial development at the turn of the century23 and is substantially the
same now as when it was first enacted. 24 Common law remedies in tort did
defines scaffolding work as a hazardous occupation. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-803(5) (1983).
Employees in such hazardous occupations have a cause of action against their employers for
death or injury. Id. § 23-801. Comparative negligence applies to these actions. Id. § 23-806.
Although most state occupational safety statutes are silent about whether an injured party
can sue an employer, several state courts have ruled that violations of the statute constitute
negligence per se. See Short v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 52 Cal. App. 3d 104, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 15 (1975); Hyde v. Russell & Russell, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 2d 578, I Cal. Rptr. 631
(1959); Baer v. Schaap, 97 N.W.2d 207 (Neb. 1959); Johnson v. Weborg, 142 Neb. 516, 7
N.W.2d 65 (1942). Other states have held that violations of such statutes are merely evidence
of negligence. See Balma v. Tidewater Oil Co., 214 A.2d 560 (Del. 1965); Roberts v. Barclay,
369 P.2d 808 (Okla. 1962). In most states, scaffold acts such as the SWA are not actively
litigated because they have been superceded by worker's compensation acts. See, e.g., Roberts
v. Barclay, 369 P.2d 808 (Okla. 1962).
10. Act of June 3, 1907, 1907 Ill. Laws 312.
I. Preamble to the Structural Work Act, 1907 Ill. Laws 312.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1983).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 61.
15. Id. § 64.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 65.
18. Id. §§ 66-67.
19. Id. § 69.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-9-1(a)(2) (1983).
21. Id. § 1005-8-3(a)(1).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1983).
23. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4 (1985). Larson stated that,
"[tlhe necessity for workmen's compensation legislation arose out of the coincidence of a sharp
increase in industrial accidents attending the rise of the factory system and a simultaneous
decrease in the employee's common-law remedies for his injuries." Id.
24. The General Assembly has amended the SWA three times. In 1951, §§ 62-63, 66, and
69 were amended to substitute "Director of Labor" for "state factory inspector." 1951 Ill.
Laws 1309. In 1972, violations of § 68 were made "petty offense[s]" rather than "punishable
by a fine of between $25 and $200," and violations of § 69 were made class A misdemeanors,
in accordance with the new criminal code. Act of Dec. 27, 1972, Pub. Act No. 77-2830, 1972
Ill. Laws 2514, 2533-34. In 1978, the SWA was amended again to make it gender neutral. Act
of Jan. 4, 1978, Pub. Act No. 80-1154, 1977 Ill. Laws 3441, 3441-42.
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not adequately protect workers" because the injured worker frequently was
required to allege and prove negligence.2 6 Many such actions failed because
workers could not prove that employers had breached a duty of due care. 27
The SWA eased the worker's burden of proving negligence by setting forth
the employer's standard of care in the first eight sections of the SWA. To
establish the defendant's breach of duty, the worker was required only to
demonstrate that the defendant had failed to comply with the statute.
Shortly after the General Assembly enacted the SWA, Illinois also adopted
its first Worker's Compensation Act (WCA). 28 Under the WCA, injured
employees surrendered their private causes of action to their employers in
return for a guaranteed disability payment. 29 The surrender provision of the
WCA precluded virtually all actions under the SWA. In 1952, however, the
Illinois Supreme Court declared that the surrender clause was unconstitu-
tional.3 0 This decision opened the door for employees to sue owners, con-
tractors, and other third parties under the SWA.3 '
25. A. LARsoN, supra note 23, § 4.50.
26. See, e.g., F.J. McCain v. Kingsley, 126 Ill. App. 165 (Ist Dist. 1906) (ironworker's
negligence action failed because employer had no duty to keep construction site in safe condition
at all times); Angus v. Lee, 40 Ill. App. 304 (Ist Dist. 1891) (bricklayer injured by falling brick
must allege and prove all elements of negligence action); Heyer v. Salsbury, 7 111. App. 93 (4th
Dist. 1880) (employer only liable if negligent in providing material or failing to warn employee,
but not required to make machinery absolutely safe). See generally I T. ANGERSTEIN, ILLINOIS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 2-3 (rev. ed. 1952) (discussing tort system prior to worker's
compensation).
27. The law only required employers to exercise reasonable care to avoid exposing employees
to unnecessary danger. Sweircz v. Illinois Steel Co., 231 Ill. 456, 83 N.E. 168 (1907). See also
Alton Paving, Bldg. & Fire Brick Co. v. Hudson, 176 Ill. 270, 52 N.E. 256 (1898) (employer
owes duty to employee to make reasonable provisions against injury to employee); Consolidated
Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 Ill. 614, 35 N.E. 162 (1893) (employer has duty to inform employee
of known defects or hazards incident to employment). But see Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v.
Clark, 108 Ill. 113 (1883) (no liability for failure to warn employee when employer does not
actually know of danger).
However, breach of this general standard was often difficult for injured employees to
establish. See, e.g., Stover Mfg. Co. v. Millane, 89 11. App. 532 (2d Dist. 1900) (whether
absence of customary safety device on elevator constitutes negligence is question for jury);
McCarthy v. Muir, 50 Ill. App. 510 (Ist Dist. 1893) (court denied recovery to employee injured
by falling trestle, because employee could not establish that employer failed to exercise reasonable
care, even if trestle was defective).
28. Act of June 10, 1911, 1911 Ill. Laws 314. This act was replaced by a more detailed act
in 1913. Act of June 28, 1913, 1913 Ill. Laws 335. The Workmen's Compensation Act initially
was voluntary. It became compulsory for extra-hazardous occupations in 1917. Act of June
25, 1917, 1917 111. Laws 505.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (1951).
30. Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952). The WCA provided
that employees who were injured by third parties in the course of their employment transferred
any actions against a third party to their employer if the third party was also covered by the
WCA. If the third party was not covered by the WCA, the injured employee could sue the
third party directly. This classification was held to violate the equal protection clauses of the
federal and state constitutions.
31. The WCA still restricts employees' actions against their employers. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, § 138.5(a) (1983).
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To succeed in an action under the SWA, an injured employee must be a
member of the class intended to be protected by the act,32 and the defendant
must owe the plaintiff a duty under the act. 3 In addition, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant wilfully violated the SWA34 and that the plaintiff's
injury was caused by that wilful violation." Most appellate decisions con-
cerning the SWA center on the definition of a covered device and structure,
36
the definition of a "wilful violation," and the scope of the defendant class
under the act. The second and third issues have the most direct bearing on
the Simmons case.
The SWA enables injured parties to sue "[f]or any injury ... occassioned
by any wilful violations of this Act, or any wilful failure to comply with
any of its provisions." 37 In Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co.,3" an early case
under the SWA, the Illinois Supreme Court defined wilfulness as mere
knowledge. In Schultz, a construction worker fell from a scaffold39 and sued
his employer. The plaintiff, Schultz, alleged both common law negligence
and a SWA violation in his complaint. The employer argued that Schultz
failed to show that the employer wilfully violated the statute.40 The court
held that a wilful violation occurred when a defendant knew of the dangerous
condition.4 1 The court interpreted the SWA in view of the statute's purpose
32. The plaintiff must be engaged in an occupation covered by the SWA. See Crafton v.
Lester B. Knight, 46 II1. 2d 533, 263 N.E.2d 817 (1970) (SWA not intended to cover all
construction related injuries); Wright v. Synergistics, 52 III. App. 3d 233, 367 N.E.2d 466 (1st
Dist. 1977) (SWA does not cover plaintiff who fell from scaffold when plaintiff was not engaged
in construction work). In addition, the plaintiff must establish that a covered device was
involved. See Long v. City of New Boston, 91 111. 2d 456, 440 N.E.2d 625 (1982) (SWA not
applicable to any device except those used in covered activities); Ashley v. Osman & Assoc.,
114 III. App. 3d 293, 448 N.E.2d 1011 (1st Dist. 1983) (elements of SWA action include covered
device used in covered activity); see also Ring, The Scaffold Act: Its Past, Present and Future,
64 ILL. B.J. 666 (1976).
33. The defendant must be an owner, contractor, subcontractor, architect, or foreman in
charge of the work. See infra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 38-54 and accompanying text. A wilful failure to comply with a provision
of the SWA is also a violation.
35. Often, injured workers will bring both negligence and SWA actions. See e.g., Grant v.
Zale Const. Co., 109 I11. App. 3d 545, 440 N.E.2d 1043 (Ist Dist. 1982); Cox v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 108 II1. App. 3d 643, 439 N.E.2d 126 (1st Dist. 1982). The defendant can raise
the plaintiff's conduct as a defense against the negligence claim.
37. Several commentators have discussed the definition of covered devices and structures.
See Ring, supra note 33, at 670-72; Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability in
Illinois: The Applicability of Comparative Fault to the Structural Work Act, 17 J. MAR. L.
REV. 493, 501-02 (1984); Note, The Illinois Structural Work Act, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 393, 397-
99.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1983).
38. 264 III. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914).
39. Id. at 160, 106 N.E. at 237-38. Schultz was transporting bricks and mortar in wheel-
barrows along a five-foot scaffold on a building under construction. Id.
40. Id. at 158, 106 N.E. at 237.
41. Id. at 166, 106 N.E. at 240.
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of preventing injuries.4 The court announced that the SWA imputes knowl-
edge of a dangerous condition to defendants whenever they know of the
condition of the structure.4 3 The court placed a corresponding duty on the
employer to know the condition of the structure." Thus, employers were
presumed liable if the conditions of their construction sites were dangerous,
regardless of any action, inaction, or knowledge on their part. 45
The court reconsidered the Schultz definition of "wilful violation" in
1958, in Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co." Kennerly was decided shortly after the
WCA was held not to preclude SWA claims.4 7 In the course of the opinion,
the court affirmed the Schultz definition of wilfulness . 4 A strong dissent by
Justice Klingbiel, however, noted that under the Schultz test, knowledge of
a condition is equated with wilfulness.4 9 Justice Klingbiel asserted that the
Schultz standard of wilfulness amounted to "mere negligence." 50 He argued
that this standard was not a proper construction of a statute that also
provided for criminal sanctions and required wilful violations for liability.5 '
Despite Justice Klingbiel's arguments, the court has not reconsidered its
position on the wilfulness standard. 2
42. Id. at 164, 106 N.E. at 239. The court stated, "[tihe object to be attained by this statute
was to prevent injuries to persons employed in this dangerous and extra-hazardous occupation."
Id.
43. Id. at 163, 106 N.E. at 239. The defendant argued that if this standard applied, then
Schultz could not recover because he also knew of the danger and therefore assumed the risk.
Id. The court did not directly address this point, but by allowing Schultz to recover, the court
apparently rejected this argument.
44. Id. at 166, 106 N.E. at 240.
45. The Court also held that whether a dangerous condition existed was a question of fact
for the jury. Id.
46. 13 111. 2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958). See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
47. Id. at 436-37, 150 N.E.2d at 137-38. Although Schultz was decided after the passage of
the first Workmen's Compensation Act, see supra note 29, the injury occurred prior to the
WCA's passage. Because of the WCA's surrender clause, the SWA was dormant for many
years. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 439, 150 N.E.2d at 139. The majority also rejected a constitutional challenge to
the SWA. Shell argued that the SWA violated due process because it was incomplete and vague,
and failed to establish a clear standard of liability. The court rejected this argument, relying
on an earlier case, Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N.E. 851 (1901), which involved the Fire-
escape Act of 1897. In Arms, the court declared that "to establish the [judicial] principle that
whatever the legislature may do it shall do in every detail or else it shall go undone, would be
almost to destroy the government." Id. at 611, 61 N.E. at 854. Therefore, the Kennerly court
found the SWA to be constitutional.
49. 13 Ill. 2d at 442-43, 150 N.E.2d at 139 (Klingbiel, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 443, 150 N.E.2d at 139 (Klingbiel, J., dissenting). Justice Klingbiel stated that
"[the majority opinion] announces the proposition that a willful violation is present whenever
the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have discovered the condition of the
scaffold. This is the test of mere negligence, not of willfullness." Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Mclnerney v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 Ill. 2d 93, 338 N.E.2d 868 (1975)("wilful" means knowing); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 I1. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967) ("wilfully"
means knowingly).
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Other litigation has centered on what parties may be liable under the
SWA's language. The SWA places a duty on "[a]ny owner, contractor,
subcontractor, foreman or other person having charge of" the structure."
Initially, it was unclear whether the statute placed liability on owners,
contractors, subcontractors, and foremen who did not have charge of the
structure. In 1911, shortly after the passage of the SWA, the Illinois Supreme
Court suggested in Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co. 4 that the SWA
would not impose liability on an owner unless he retained control over the
structure." In 1923, the court decided in John Griffiths & Son Co. v.
National Fireproofing Co. 6 that a contractor who was liable under the SWA
could seek indemnity from another party whose negligence actually caused
the injury for which the contractor was liable." The court rejected the
argument that the SWA placed a non-delegable duty on owners and con-
tractors."8
The Claffy and Griffiths cases remained the law throughout the dormant
period of the SWA. However, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished these
cases and changed its position on the issue in Kennerly. 9 In that case, a
welder named Kennerly fell from a scaffold erected by his employer, Foster
Wheeler; Kennerly sued Shell Oil, the owner of the structure, under the
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1983).
54. 249 II1. 210, 94 N.E. 551 (1911).
55. Id. at 221, 94 N.E. at 554. The issue in Claffy was whether an owner who retained
some control over a construction site could avoid liability if another party also had some control
over the construction. The court held that § 66 of the SWA put the burden of compliance on
both owner and contractor. Id. at 222, 94 N.E.2d at 555. The court relied on a New York
case, Rooney v. Brogan Constr. Co., 194 N.Y. 32, 86 N.E. 814 (1909), which involved a similar
statute. 249 Ill. at 221, 94 N.E. at 554.
56. 310 111. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923).
57. Id. at 342, 141 N.E. 743. John Griffiths & Son was the general contractor that
constructed the Lytton building in Chicago. Griffiths subcontracted the fireproofing work to
National Fireproofing Co. Id. at 332, 141 N.E. 739. Slaughter, a construction worker who
worked on an adjoining building, was injured when a fireproof tile fell from a scaffold and
struck him in the head. Slaughter brought an action against Griffiths, National Fireproofing,
the building owner, and others. National Fireproofing settled with Slaughter, who pursued his
action against Griffiths and the others. National Fireproofing refused to defend the action,
which resulted in the jury returning a verdict for Slaughter. Id. at 333-34, 141 N.E. at 739-40.
Griffiths then brought this action against National Fireproofing to enforce the indemnity clause
in their contract.
Under active-passive indemnity, a tortfeasor who was only passively negligent can recover
from a joint tortfeasor whose active negligence caused the injury. See Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill.
2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1%7). For a discussion of common-law contribution and indemnity
in Illinois, see Michael and Appel, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in
Illinois: A Need for Reform, 7 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 591 (1976); Polelle, Contribution Among
Negligent Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: A Squeamish Damsel Comes of Age, 1 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 267 (1970).
58. 310 111. at 336, 141 N.E. at 741. As discussed above, the SWA was dormant for most
of the first half of the twentieth century. After the Illinois Supreme Court reopened the door
to SWA suits, the Griffiths holding was revived as precedent. See, e.g., Schmid v. United
States, 154 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Ill. 1957).
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SWA. After a questionable examination of precedent, notably Claffy and
Griffiths, the Kennerly court concluded that the SWA placed a non-delegable
duty on owners, regardless of whether the owners were actually in charge
of the site. 60
The Kennerly standard, however, lasted only a few years before the court
reverted to its original position. In Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul,
& Pac. Ry., 61 the supreme court overruled Kennerly and held that an owner
or contractor actually has to be in charge of the site to be liable under the
SWA. 62 In Gannon, the plaintiff was a bricklayer working for the general
contractor, who was constructing a loading dock on the railway's property. 63
Gannon fell from a scaffold on the site, and initially sued both his employer
and the railway. The employer, however, was dismissed because the WCA
barred worker's suits against employers. 64 The jury returned a verdict of
$45,000 for Gannon. The appellate court reversed, holding that an owner
was only liable under the SWA if the owner was actually in charge of the
work . 6
In its review of the appellate decision, the Illinois Supreme Court reex-
amined the issue of whether an owner of a construction site had to be in
charge of the work to be liable under the SWA for worker injuries. The
court determined that the Claffy and Griffiths cases were not controlling,6
and looked instead to the legislative intent behind the SWA67 as construed
in the Schultz decision. 68 The Gannon court concluded that the Illinois
General Assembly did not intend to impose absolute liability on owners
59. 13 Ill. 2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958). The plaintiff, Kennerly, worked for Foster
Wheeler Corporation, which was constructing a distillery on Shell's property. The lower court
found Shell liable. Shell appealed the judgment, contending that the SWA only imposed liability
on an owner when he was in charge of the work. Id. at 433, 150 N.E.2d at 136.
60. Id. at 434-37, 150 N.E.2d at 136. Justice Klingbiel dissented from the decision and
argued that the decisions relied on by the majority did not support the imposition of liability
upon an owner, per se. Id. at 441-42, 150 N.E.2d at 140 (Klingbiel, J., dissenting). Justice
Klingbiel also argued that the language of the statute limited liability to "such owner, contractor,
sub-contractor, foreman, or other person violating any of the (SWA's] provisions" and war-
ranted a contrary decision because the "such" referred to "having charge of" in the preceding
clause. Id. at 440, 150 N.E.2d at 140 (Klingbiel, J., dissenting).
An explanation for the court's decision in Kennerly may be found by examining another
decision decided the same day. In Gannon v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. Ry., 13 Ill. 2d 460,
150 N.E.2d 141 (1958), the court held that § 5(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act prevented
an employee from suing his employer under the SWA. Id. at 462, 150 N.E.2d at 143. Had this
holding been applied to the Kennerly fact situation, it would have prevented Kennerly from
suing his employer.
61. 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
62. Id. at 321, 175 N.E.2d at 793.
63. Id. at 307, 175 N.E.2d at 786.
64. Gannon v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. Ry., 13 III. 2d 460, 150 N.E.2d 141 (1958). See
supra note 60.
65. 22 III. 2d at 309, 175 N.E.2d at 787.
66. Id. at 315-16, 175 N.E.2d at 790-91.
67. Id. at 317, 175 N.E.2d at 791.
68. Id.
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because the SWA did not impose absolute liability on any other party. 69 In
addition, absolute liability was a disfavored doctrine at the time that the
SWA was passed.10 The court also observed that the language of the statute
was disjunctive,"' and therefore concluded that the plaintiff must demonstrate
that an owner was in charge of the work in order to recover damages from
the owner.
After the Gannon decision, lower courts in Illinois groped for a definition
of the phrase "having charge of," which appears in the SWA to describe
the potentially liable class." The Illinois Supreme Court clarified the issue
in Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co." The Larson trial court gave the
jury an instruction that equated "having charge of" with retaining control
and supervision over the construction work. 74 The supreme court rejected
this instruction; yet, the court did acknowledge that control and supervision
of a site might be factors in determining whether the defendant has charge
of the work. 7 The supreme court noted that neither the SWA nor the
Gannon rationale required that a defendant retain control and supervision
over the work to be liable.76 The court also rejected the argument that the
phrase "having charge of" had to be defined for the jurors. The court
stated:
69. Id. at 319, 175 N.E.2d at 792.
70. Id. The Gannon court noted that the WCA was upheld only because it was considered
a reasonable regulation of the employment relationship. Id.
71. Id. at 319-20, 175 N.E.2d at 792-93. The court examined § 69, which reads in pertinent
part:
Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge of
the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting . . . shall
comply with all the terms [of the SWA].
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1983) (emphasis added). The court noted that the effect of
Kennerly was to construe "or" as "and." 22 111. 2d at 319-20, 175 N.E.2d at 792-93.
In a dissent, Justice Hershey urged that Kennerly be upheld. Justice Hershey argued that if
the supreme court construed a statute once,' then that construction became part of the statute
and only the legislature could alter the construction. Id. at 325, 175 N.E.2d at 795 (Hershey,
J., dissenting). He was joined in this dissent by Chief Justice Schaefer, who had authored the
Kennerly opinion.
72. See, e.g., Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 48 111. App. 2d 349, 199 N.E.2d 265
(Ist Dist. 1964) (upholding jury instruction that equated "in charge of" with control and
supervision), rev'd, 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965); Melvin v. Thompson, 39 II. App.
2d 413, 188 N.E.2d 497 (ist Dist. 1963) (affirming summary judgment for defendant-owner
where evidence was conflicting as to whether owner supervised the work).
73. 33 111. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
74. The complete instruction was:
The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages
under the provisions of the Structural Work Act unless he has proven by a
preponderance, or greater weight of the evidence, that the defendant, Common-
wealth Edison Company, had charge of the work by retaining control and super-
vision of such work being performed by Paschen Contractors, Inc.
Id. at 320-21, 211 N.E.2d at 250.
75. Id. at 322, 211 N.E.2d at 251.
76. Id.
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It is well established that the meaning of words, used in their conventional
sense, need not be defined or explained in giving instructions to the jury.
The term "having charge of" is one of common usage and understanding,
and it is our opinion that further attempt at definition can only lead to
confusion and error."
The court concluded that the references to control and supervision should
not be included in the instruction because it placed a higher burden of proof
on the plaintiff.7
After Larson, lower courts continued to struggle with the statutory phrase
"having charge of." Appellate and trial courts were repeatedly called upon
to determine what type of facts were required to prove that a defendant was
in charge of the work.19 The Illinois Supreme Court again attempted to
clarify the issue in McGovern v. Standish. 0 To determine whether an architect
was liable under the SWA for a worker's injuries, the McGovern court
traced the history of the phrase "having charge of," as interpreted in the
Larson case and other cases that followed. The court concluded that "a
determination [of having charge] must rest upon an assessment of the totality
of the circumstances. " ' Although McGovern has been criticised for its
holding that the architect in question was not in charge,82 the Illinois Supreme
77. Id. at 323, 211 N.E.2d at 252 (citations omitted). The Gannon and Larson decisions
hinted that more than one person could be in charge of the work. This position is reflected in
the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 180.02 which reads:
Under the [SWA], it is possible for more than one person to "have charge of" the
work. One or more persons can have charge of the overall work, and other persons
can have charge of the phase of the work in connection with which an injury
occurs. In that event, all of them would "have charge of" the work within the
meaning of the [SWA].
Who had charge of the work under the particular facts of this case is for you to
decide.
This instruction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Emberton v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.. 71 Ill. 2d I11, 373 N.E.2d 1348 (1978); see also Crotty v. High-Low Foods,
Inc., 78 Ill. App. 2d 237, 223 N.E.2d 442 (ist Dist. 1966) (liability under SWA extends to all
who were in charge of site, not limited to persons who erected the used scaffold).
78. 33 I1. 2d at 322-23, 211 N.E.2d at 251.
79. See, e.g., Buehler v. Toynan Constr. Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 106, 272 N.E.2d 861 (Ist
Dist. 1971) (subcontrator who only ordered materials and contracted for labor was not in charge
of site), aff'd, 52 Ill. 2d 214, 287 N.E.2d 691 (1972); Bruen v. Burton Auto Spring Corp., 130
Ill. App. 2d 477, 266 N.E.2d 176 (ist Dist. 1970) (owner of crane not in charge when another
party used crane in repairs).
80. 65 Il1. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976). McGovern was an ironworker for a construction
company who fell from a scaffold while working on a hospital addition. Standish was the
architect hired by the hospital. Id. at 57, 357 N.E.2d at 1136.
81. Id. at 68, 357 N.E.2d at 1141 (emphasis added). McGovern argued that under Miller
v. DeWitt, 37 Il. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967), an architect was in charge if he had the right
to stop the work. The court rejected this argument and formulated the "totality of circum-
stances" standard. 65 Ill. 2d at 68, 357 N.E.2d at 1141.
82. See, e.g., Emberton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 11. 2d III, 373 N.E.2d
1348 (1978) (overruling appellate court finding that, based on McGovern, architect was not
in charge).
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Court reaffirmed the validity of the totality of circumstances approach in
Norton v. Wilbur Waggoner Co.81 In Norton, which involved an owner as
the defendant,84 the court used the totality of circumstances test to determine
if the owner was sufficiently in charge of the construction site. Since Norton,
Illinois courts have regularly used the totality of circumstances test. 85 How-
ever, the test lends itself to uneven application in particular factual situa-
tions.16
Once the elements of an SWA violation are established, a defendant is
automatically liable.87 The statute does not state whether common law de-
fenses apply to SWA actions, but the supreme court has construed the statute
to abrogate the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.88
Therefore, to avoid liability, a defendant must successfully argue that one
of the following elements of an SWA action is not present: (1) there is no
structure; (2) there is no wilful violation; or (3) the defendant did not have
charge of the work.
B. Comparative Negligence
The Illinois Supreme Court definitively adopted the doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence in 1885.89 Under this doctrine, the plaintiff had to be
83. 76 111. 2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 403 (1979).
84. Norton worked for the R & R Construction Company, a general contractor that
constructed a new school. Norton was injured when a crane operator lowered a crane ball onto
his back while he was disconnecting hoisting straps from construction materials. Norton sued
the architect, the subcontractor, and the school district. The architect and subcontractor were
dismissed, and a jury returned a verdict for Norton against the school district. The appellate
court reversed on the ground that the school district was not in charge of the site. Id. at 484-
85, 394 N.E. 2d at 404.
85. For a listing of factors various appellate courts have used to determine whether defendant
is in charge, see Chance v. City of Collinsville, 112 II1. App. 3d 6, 445 N.E.2d 39 (5th Dist.
1983).
86. Compare Blake v. Tri-State Crane Serv., 114 111. App. 3d 1059, 449 N.E.2d 946 (1st
Dist. 1983) (subcontractor who supplied crane and crane operator not in charge), and Hausam
v. Victor Gruen & Assoc., 86 111. App. 3d 1145, 408 N.E.2d 1051 (3d Dist. 1980) (architect
without power to make changes or stop work was not in charge) with Ilc v. Henry Crown &
Co., 97 Ill. App. 3d 231, 422 N.E.2d 892 (1st Dist. 1981) (owner who hired general contractor
to oversee work was in charge).
87. See, e.g., Carlton v. Verplaetse, 120 11. App. 3d 795, 458 N.E.2d 584 (3d Dist. 1983)
(fact that plaintiff disregarded instruction to stop working not defense if plaintiff establishes
elements of SWA action); Basden v. Kiefner Bros., 92 Il. App. 3d 218, 414 N.E.2d 951 (5th
Dist. 1980) (reference to plaintiff's experience in carpentry was improper introduction of the
issue of contributory negligence); Beebe v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 43, 358
N.E.2d 1343 (3d Dist. 1977) (once wilful violation shown to be a proximate cause, evidence of
plaintiff's standard procedures was improper as evidence of contributory negligence).
88. See Vegich v. McDougal Hartman Co., 84 Ill. 2d 461, 419 N.E.2d 918 (1981); Bryntesen
v. Carroll Constr. Co., 27 III. 2d 566, 190 N.E.2d 315 (1963); Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co.,
264 111. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914).
89. Contributory negligence was developed in England in Butterfield v. Forrester, II East
60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). In Illinois, the doctrine was initially adopted in Aurora
Branch R.R. v. Grimes, 13 III. 585 (1852), but was replaced six years later by comparative
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completely free of negligence in order to recover damages. If the plaintiff
in any way failed to exercise reasonable care or due diligence, the claim was
totally barred. Contributory negligence was the law in the majority of
jurisdictions during the first half of the twentieth century. 90 Yet, because of
the doctrine's inherent harshness on plaintiffs, it was often modified by
exceptions such as the last clear chance doctrine.9' Such exceptions, never-
theless, were narrowly drawn and did not vary the basic rule of contributory
negligence.
The practice of comparing the relative fault of parties developed long
before the doctrine of contributory negligence. Admiralty courts used com-
parative fault principles to allocate damages among defendants as far back
as the Middle Ages. 9 Comparative negligence93 was developed to alleviate
the harshness of contributory negligence. 94 Under comparative negligence,
the effect of the plaintiff's negligence on the resulting injury is compared
under some formula with the defendant's negligence. 95 Courts have developed
negligence. Galena & Chi. Un. R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858). Because lower courts
experienced difficulties in applying Jacobs, the Illinois Supreme Court returned to contributory
negligence in Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 I11. 358, 3 N.E. 456 (1885). For a
detailed discussion of these early developments, see Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L.
REV. 36 (1944). Illinois reverted to comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar. See infra notes
103-08 and accompanying text.
90. See James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Malone, The Formative
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946).
91. Under the last clear chance doctrine, a plaintiff's claim was not barred by his negligence
if the defendant had the last chance to avoid the accident. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 66 (1984) (hereinafter cited as
PROSSER & KEETONi. The last clear chance doctrine was never adopted in Illinois. Specht v.
Chicago City Ry., 233 111. App. 384 (Ist Dist. 1924); Bushman v. Calumet & S. Chi. Ry., 214
Ill. App. 435 (Ist Dist. 1919).
92. The origins of comparative negligence are in dispute. At least one commentator claims
that the doctrine can be traced to Roman law. Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative
Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 337 (1932). Another commentator claims that comparative
negligence originated in the admiralty courts of the middle ages, where the fault of the various
parties was compared. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm.[-IKENT L. REV.
189, 221 (1950). In any event, the doctrine was adopted by statute in most of the civil law
nations of Europe and in England. See generally C. HEFr & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
MANUAL §§ 2.10-.30 (1978) [hereinafter cited as C. HEF]; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEG-
LIGENCE § 1.3 (1974); H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT §§ 1:9-:10 (1978).
In the United States, comparative negligence was first adopted in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982), and was subsequently codified in other federal statutes.
See C. HEFT, supra. §§ 2.50, 3.20; V. SCHWARTZ, supra, § 1.4. Comparative negligence was
adopted sporadically by the states into the common law during the first half of this century;
it has been adopted widely during the last twenty years. V. SCHWARTZ, supra, §§ 1.4-1.5; H.
WOODS, supra, § 1. 11; Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States
and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299 (1980). For a state-by-state analysis
of the status of comparative negligence, see C. HEFT, supra.
93. As used in this Note, comparative negligence refers to the practice of comparing the
plaintiff's negligence, or fault, with that of the defendant's.
94. Turk, supra note 92, at 221.
95. Procedurally, the trier of fact assigns each party's negligence a percentage, with the
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several methods by which to compare negligence. Under the "pure" form
of comparative negligence, the plaintiff can only recover that portion of the
damages attributable to the defendant's negligence. 96 With pure comparative
negligence, plaintiffs can theoretically be ninety-nine percent at fault and
still recover one percent of their damages from a defendant who is one
percent negligent.
Another method of comparing negligence is the modified form. There are
two types of modified comparative negligence: the fifty percent and the
forty-nine percent type. Under fifty percent modified comparative negligence,
a plaintiff can recover damages so long as the plaintiff's negligence is not
greater than the defendant's negligence. 97 If the plaintiff's negligence is
greater than the defendant's, then the plaintiff is barred from recovery. As
in the pure form, however, if the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than
the defendant's negligence, then the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the
percent of the plaintiff's negligence. Under forty-nine percent modified
comparative negligence, plaintiffs can only recover if their negligence is not
as great as the defendant's negligence. If a plaintiff's negligence is as great
as a defendant's, then the plaintiff's negligence completely bars recovery. If
a plaintiff's negligence is less than a defendant's, then the plaintiff can
recover, but the recovery is reduced as in the pure form.98
State courts gradually adopted comparative negligence as a means of
lessening the harshness of contributory negligence. The primary reasons that
support the adoption of comparative negligence are: one, the doctrine is
more equitable to plaintiffs, and two, juries naturally tend to practice
comparative negligence by finding for the plaintiff while lowering the award
total equalling 100%0. For example, the jury could find that the plaintiff was 25% negligent,
and that one defendant was 40% negligent while another defendant was 35% negligent.
96. Using the figures in note 95, if the damages were determined to be $20,000, the plaintiff
would be entitled to receive 75% (40% plus 35%] of the damages, which equals $15,000.
Comparative negligence does not affect joint and several liability in Illinois. Coney v. J.L.G.
Indus. Inc., 97 I11. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1982). Thus, in the above example, the plaintiff
could seek to recover the full amount, $15,000, from either defendant. A few states have
determined that comparative negligence abrogates the doctrine of joint and several liability. See
H. WOODS, supra note 92, § 13:4.
97. A plaintiff can recover if he is 50% negligent-hence the term 50% modified comparative
negligence.
98. In numerical terms, a plaintiff can recover as long as his negligence is 49% or less. For
a discussion of both forms of modified comparative negligence, see C. HEFr, supra note 92,
§ 1.40; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, § 3.5; H. WOODS, supra note 92, §§ 4:3-:4.
Two other methods of comparative negligence are used in the United States. Nebraska and
South Dakota have adopted the slight-gross method. Under this method, a plaintiff can recover
if the plaintiff's negligence was "slight" as compared with defendant's negligence. NEB. Rv.
STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979). See generally C. HEFr, supra
note 92, § 1.30; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, § 3.4. Tennessee applies a unique doctrine, under
which a plaintiff can recover if the plaintiff's negligence contributed remotely to his injury,
but the plaintiff's negligence will reduce his award. See C. HEFr, supra note 92, at § 3.500;
Turk, supra note 92, at 313.
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for damages.9 The gradual movement to the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence has accelerated during the last twenty years.'°°
In Maki v. Frelk,' °0 a 1968 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court declined
to replace contributory negligence with comparative negligence. The Maki
court concluded that such a far-reaching change in the law should be made
by the Illinois General Assembly.102 However, in 1981 the supreme court
reversed itself and adopted pure comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar.0 3
The Alvis court traced the history of both contributory and comparative
negligence, and noted that thirty-six states had adopted some form of
comparative negligence.1 4 The court determined that application of the
doctrine of comparative negligence produced a more just result than the
doctrine of contributory negligence. 0 Furthermore, the court rejected the
argument that juries would find comparative negligence difficult to admin-
ister because so many states had already successfully applied the doctrine."1
While the defendant in Alvis urged that the Maki decision be followed, the
court noted that contributory negligence was a judicially created doctrine
which could be altered by the court.""7 The court decided that it was necessary
99. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 I1. 2d 1, 19, 421 N.E.2d 886, 894 (1981); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973).
100. See supra note 92.
l01. 40 III. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
102. Id. at 196, 239 N.E.2d at 447. Other courts have also maintained that the decision to
adopt comparative negligence belongs to the legislature. See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d
815 (Ala. 1980); Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1971); Baab v. Shockling, 61 Ohio
St. 2d 55, 399 N.E.2d 87 (1980); Peterson v. Culp, 255 Or. 269, 465 P.2d 876 (1970); Bridges
v. Union Pac. R.R., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d 738 (1971). For a discussion of the merits of
judicial versus legislative adoption see James, Kalven, Keeton, Leflar, Malone, and Wade,
Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative Negligence v. Contributory Negligence: Should the
Court or Legislature Decide, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968).
103. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
104. Id. at 11-14, 421 N.E.2d at 890-91.
105. Id. at 15, 421 N.E.2d at 892.
106. Id. at 17, 421 N.E.2d at 893. The defendant also argued that adoption of comparative
negligence would contribute to an increased number of claims, a reduction in settlements, and
a jamming of court dockets. Id. at 19, 421 N.E.2d at 894. The court was not persuaded by
this argument:
We believe that the defendants' fears concerning the judicial administrative problems
attendant upon the adoption of comparative negligence are exaggerated. But were
defendants' fears well founded, we could nevertheless not allow contributory neg-
ligence to remain the law of this State in the face of overwhelming evidence of its
harsh and unjust results.
Id. at 20, 421 N.E.2d at 894 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 22, 421 N.E.2d at 895. The Illinois Defense Counsel, in an amicus brief, argued
that the legislature was better equipped to adopt comparative negligence. The Defense Counsel
stated that judicial adoption of the doctrine would result in a piecemeal approach that would
leave many related issues unresolved. The court responded to this argument by stating that
most states' comparative negligence statutes are very broad and leave the resolution of most
legal issues to the courts. Therefore, waiting for the General Assembly would not result in a
better comparative negligence law in Illinois. Id. at 24, 421 N.E.2d at 895.
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to step in and end the stalemate between the legislature and judiciary, and
accordingly the court adopted comparative negligence.""
In the years following Alvis, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a number
of decisions that defined the scope of comparative negligence. 1°9 In 1983,
the court applied comparative negligence to strict products liability actions
in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries."' Illinois had already adopted the strict
liability standard of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts"' in
Suvada v. White Motors Co.'12 Since the Suvada decision, the defenses to
strict liability actions in Illinois had been severely limited. Contributory
negligence was not a defense in products cases unless the plaintiff's conduct
amounted to misuse of product or assumption of risk.' 3 The misuse of
product defense barred recovery to a plaintiff who used a product for a
purpose that the manufacturer could not foresee." 4 Assumption of risk,
108. Id. at 27, 421 N.E.2d at 896. The Alvis court stated:
There are . . . times when there exists a mutual state of inaction in which the court
awaits action by the legislature and the legislature awaits guidance from the court.
Such a stalemate is a manifest injustice to the public. When such a stalemate exists
and the legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to remedy a gap in the common
law that results in the injustice, it is the imperative duty of the court to remedy the
injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society.
Id. The court noted that in the time since Maki had been decided, 30 states had adopted
comparative negligence to replace contributory negligence. Id. at 24, 421 N.E.2d at 898. Finally,
the court held that its decision only applied to cases in which trial commenced on or after June
8, 1981. Id.
Judge Underwood dissented, arguing that the decision to replace contributory negligence
should be left to the General Assembly. Id. at 29, 421 N.E.2d at 898 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
Judge Ryan joined in Judge Underwood's dissent; in his separate dissent, Judge Ryan argued
that the Court should wait for the General Assembly to act. Id. at 35, 421 N.E.2d at 901
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
109. Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Il. 2d 1, 454 N.E.2d 382 (1984) (negligence of defendants compared
under Contribution Act); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983)
(comparative negligence applies to strict liability).
110. 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
111. Section 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
112. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
113. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I1. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
114. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (failure to discover
defect or to guard againt possible defect does not amount to contributory negligence; proceeding
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which also barred recovery, applied if a plaintiff expressly or impliedly
consented to the risk created by the product.' 5 The misuse of product and
assumption of risk defenses were total bars to recovery in products liability
actions in Illinois.
The Coney court considered the policy that supported strict products
liability. The court noted that strict liability was imposed on manufacturers
because they invite and solicit the use of their products, create the risk, and
reap the benefits. 6 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that applying
comparative negligence to strict liability actions would defeat this policy.
The court observed that eighteen of twenty-three states that had addressed
the issue allowed the defense." 7 Adoption of comparative negligence, the
court reasoned, would not countermand this policy because the plaintiff's
burden of proof was still eased and the defendant was still strictly liable.
Thus, the court held that comparative negligence could be used to reduce
plaintiff awards in strict products liability actions. The court also stated that
the old defenses of misuse of product and assumption of risk were no longer
total bars to recovery. Instead, such conduct should be compared to the
defendant's fault and used to reduce the plaintiff's damages." 8
The key to understanding Coney, and the other cases that have applied
comparative negligence to strict liability actions, is to appreciate the distinc-
tion between the doctrines of contributory and comparative negligence.
Contributory negligence is a defense against liability; it operates to relieve
the defendant of all liability. Thus, contributory negligence was not a defense
to SWA actions or other actions based on strict liability. Comparative
negligence, however, is not a defense against liability; it is a doctrine for
apportioning damages. Therefore, comparative negligence is not a defense
to strict liability. Instead, comparative negligence operates to reduce the
damages paid by a strictly liable defendant.
in spite of known dangerous defect is assumption of risk). Foreseeability of the use is measured
objectively. Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57 Ill. 2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128 (1974). The question of
whether a plaintiff's conduct amounts to misuse is reserved for the jury. Id. at 102, 311 N.E.2d
at 133. However, because the definition of the term "misuse of product" differs from the
ordinary definition of misuse, the jury instruction must be limited to instruct the jury properly.
Lancaster v. Jeffrey Gallon, Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d 819, 396 N.E.2d 648 (2d Dist. 1979).
115. See James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952); Wade, The Place of As-
sumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REy. (1961).
In Illinois, assumption of risk was a defense only in situations where the plaintiff and the
defendant were in a contractual or employment relationship. Court v. Grzelinski, 71 Il1. 2d
141, 379 N.E.2d 281 (1978); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 11. 2d 529, 248 N.E.2d I1l (1969). In products
liability actions, however, no such relationship was necessary, and assumption of risk acted as
a total bar to recovery. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Il. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 304 (1970)
(defining assumption of risk as proceeding in use of product despite known or discovered
dangerous defect).
116. 97 I1. 2d at 110-11, 454 N.E.2d at 200 (citing Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965)).
117. 97 Ill. 2d at 112-14, 454 N.E.2d at 201.
118. Id. at 116, 454 N.E.2d at 202.
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III. THE SIMMONS DECISION
The site of the accident in Simmons v. Union Electric Co." 9 was a
decommissioned power plant in Cahokia, Illinois, that was owned by Union
Electric. Union Electric contracted with Sachs Electric Company (Sachs) to
install an electrical system that would furnish electricity to portions of the
plant, and to maintain and repair the electrical system when problems arose.
Sachs did not maintain any regular personnel at the plant, but Union Electric
employees or security personnel were always present to apprise Sachs of any
problems.
Edward Simmons worked for Sachs as a journeyman electrician. On
December 19, 1978, Simmons went to the Cahokia plant with another Sachs
employee in response to a trouble call. Upon arrival, they discovered that
an ash pit had flooded. 20 Simmons determined that the temporary and
permanent sump pumps located in the ash pit had malfunctioned. After
Simmons bailed out the ash pit, he decided that the temporary pump had
to be removed for repairs. 2' To reach the temporary pump, Simmons climbed
down a ladder attached to the pit wall; he slipped from the rungs, and fell
approximately fifteen feet to the bottom of the pit.122
Simmons brought an action against Union Electric under the SWA and
under common law negligence. Union Electric filed a third-party complaint
against Sachs that sought indemnity or contribution from Sachs. Sachs then
filed a counterclaim against Simmons, seeking either indemnity or contri-
bution. 23 At a bench trial, Union Electric employees testified that the rungs
of the ladder might have been slippery due to oil that may have been left
by the flood waters. 24 The trial judge found in favor of Simmons on the
SWA count and in favor of Sachs on Union Electric's third party complaint
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District affirmed the judgment
for Simmons against Union Electric.'12 However, it reversed the trial court's
decision on the third party complaint and found for Union Electric.2 6 The
appellate court allowed Union Electric to seek common law indemnity from
Sachs because Union Electric's conduct was merely passive, while Sachs was
actively negligent. 27 After the appellate court determined that Union Electric
was entitled to indemnity from Sachs, it had to decide whether Sachs could
119. 121 I1. App. 3d 743, 748, 460 N.E.2d 28, 32 (5th Dist. 1984). The facts are taken from
the appellate court's decision where they are set out in more detail.
120. Id. at 749, 460 N.E.2d at 32.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 750, 460 N.E.2d at 32. At the trial, Simmons testified that he slipped on oil on
the ladder. In a deposition taken prior to trial, he testified that he did not know why he
slipped. Id.
123. Id. at 748, 460 N.E.2d at 31.
124. Id. at 755, 460 N.E.2d at 36. A Union Electric engineer testified that on a previous
occasion, Union Electric hired a clean-up company to remove oil after a flood. Id.
125. Id. at 761, 460 N.E.2d at 40.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 759, 460 N.E.2d at 39.
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seek indemnity from Simmons.1 28 Sachs argued that Simmons was liable for
indemnity to Sachs under the SWA because Simmons was a foreman. The
court rejected this argument, and stated that the precedent in support of
Sachs' claim involved injured parties who were themselves independent legal
entities.2 9 Therefore, the court held that Simmons was not liable to Sachs.
The appellate court did not address the issue of whether comparative
negligence applied to the SWA. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, agreed
to resolve the issue even though it was not raised below.'30 The court decided
that in order to affect the General Assembly's intent behind the SWA, an
injured worker's conduct should not be a factor that reduces the worker's
recovery under the SWA.
Before the court addressed the applicability of comparative negligence to
SWA actions, it first had to determine whether Union Electric was liable
under the SWA. The court concurred with the trial court that Union Electric
was in charge of the plant 3' and concluded that the ash pit was a structure
128. Because the trial court found for Sachs, it did not decide whether Sachs had to indemnify
Union Electric.
129. 121 111. App. 3d at 762, 460 N.E.2d at 40-41. Sachs relied on Brown v. Village of
Shipman, 89 III. App. 3d 162, 411 N.E.2d 569 (4th Dist. 1980), and National Oats Co. v.
Volkman, 29 III. App. 3d 298, 330 N.E.2d 514 (5th Dist. 1975). In Brown, an owner was
allowed to seek indemnity against the plaintiff, who was an individual contractor in charge of
the work. The court said:
A]Illowing the counterclaim against [plaintiff) for indemnity would permit his
contributory negligence to indirectly nullify any cause of action. However . . . he
was a contractor in charge of the work and subject to the liabilities of the Structural
Work Act. He did not have the ... status of "a protected person within the
meaning of the Act."
89 Ill. App. 3d at 166, 411 N.E.2d at 572. Similarly, in National Oats, the owner was allowed
to seek indemnity from the subcontractor. The subcontractor was a partnership, and the plaintiff
decedent was a general partner. The appellate court allowed the defendant to seek indemnity
even though the court recognized that the decedent's estate would share in any judgment against
the partnership. 29 Il1. App. 3d at 303, 330 N.E.2d at 517.
To distinguish these cases, the appellate court relied on Flora v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 685 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1982), in which Brown and National Oats were examined. The
Flora court held that the SWA protected a person who was injured while working for a separate
agency. However, the plaintiff cannot recover when he is personally in charge of the work and
the active tortfeasor. Id. at 211. Therefore, because Simmons worked for a separate agency,
he was not subject to liability under the SWA. 121 Ill. App. 3d at 762, 460 N.E.2d at 40-41.
130. 104 Ill. 2d at 451, 473 N.E.2d at 949. The appellate court held that Simmons was not
liable to Sachs, but it ruled on indemnity grounds, rather than on comparative negligence. See
supra note 129. The Supreme Court decided the issue pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 318(a),
which reads:
In all appeals, by whatever method, from the Appellate Court to the Supreme
Court, any appellee, respondent, or co-party may seek and obtain any relief
warranted by the record on appeal without having filed a separate petition for leave
to appeal or notice of cross appeal or separate appeal.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 0A, § 318(a) (1983). The Supreme Court used this rule in conjunction
with Rule 366(a), which allows any Illinois court, on appeal, to issue any order and to decide
any issue raised by any party that is warranted by the record. Id. § 366(a).
131. The court found that Union Electric was in charge of the site based on the totality of
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under the SWA.13 2 The court applied the Schultz test of wilful violation,"'
and decided that because Union Electric knew that an oily residue had been
left on the ladder after prior floods, Union Electric knew about the dangerous
conditions on this occasion. 3 4 Therefore, Union Electric was found to be
liable under the SWA.
Having determined that Union Electric was liable under the SWA and
entitled to indemnification from Sachs,' the court then considered the effect
of the plaintiff's conduct on his ability to recover damages. To determine
whether comparative negligence applied in the case, the court examined the
policy behind the SWA.' 3 6 The court analogized the SWA to the Road
Construction Injuries Act (RCIA), 3 7 which the court had previously con-
strued in Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Co."'3 The Vegich court noted that
liability under a statute was not equivalent to liability under common law.
The purpose of the RCIA, the Vegich court reasoned, was not to compensate
victims, but to prevent accidents from occurring. Thus, the application of
contributory negligence to reduce damages in an RCIA case was inconsistent
with that statute's purpose.3 9 The Simmons court concluded that because
the RCIA and the SWA both had the same purpose-to prevent occupational
injuries-the policy arguments raised against contributory negligence in the
Vegich case also applied to the Simmons case. The court therefore held that
comparative negligence was not applicable to claims brought under the
SWA.140
the circumstances: Union Electric inspected and had final acceptance of Sachs's work, Union
Electric employees were present, and Sachs's employees were not present until requested by
Union Electric. 104 Ill. 2d at 452, 473 N.E.2d at 950.
132. Id. at 452-53, 473 N.E.2d at 950. Union Electric argued that because Simmons was
injured while repairing a sump pump-which is not a structure-the SWA did not apply. The
court followed Navlyt v. Kalinich, 53 111. 2d 137, 290 N.E.2d 219 (1972), in which a sewer
trench was held to be a structure within the SWA. The Court reasoned that because the ash
pit retained the sump pump, the pit was within the purview of the act.
133. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
134. 104 Il1. 2d at 453, 473 N.E.2d at 450.
135. Sachs argued that because Union Electric was in charge of the ash pit, Union Electric
was actively negligent and therefore not entitled to indemnity from Sachs. The court, in response,
suggested that the Contribution Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 301-305 (1983), preempted
common law active-passive indemnity. Because neither party raised that issue, however, the
court applied active-passive indemnity.
The Court rejected Sachs's claim and ordered Sachs to indemnify Union Electric. The Court
noted that under Sachs' contract with Union Electric, Sachs was responsible for supplying all
safety equipment, lighting, and directions needed for repairs, while Union Electric was required
only to notify Sachs and inspect their work. 104 Ill. 2d at 454, 473 N.E.2d at 951. The court
declared, "[mlerely having charge of the work is not disposative on the issue of which of two
tortfeasors is actively negligent. Thus, Union Electric can be found to be both in charge of the
work and passively negligent." Id. Therefore, Sachs had to indemnify Union Electric.
136. Id. at 456-57, 473 N.E.2d at 952.
137. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121, §§ 314.1-.8 (1983).
138. 84 Ill. 2d 461, 419 N.E.2d 918 (1981).
139. Id. at 467, 419 N.E.2d at 920.
140. 104 Ill. 2d at 461, 473 N.E.2d at 954. The court supported its position further by noting
19851
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE SIMMONS DECISION
While at first glance the court's reasoning in Simmons is. persuasive, a
closer examination of the opinion reveals flaws in the court's reasoning. The
Simmons court relied heavily on the Vegich decision to support its conclusion
that comparative negligence did not apply in SWA actions. However, there
are two problems with using Vegich to support the Simmons decision: (1)
Vegich was decided before comparative negligence was adopted in Illinois;
and (2) the Vegich court's construction of the RCIA was itself influenced
by other statutes, including the SWA. The court also purportedly examined
the legislative intent behind the SWA and found that it was in accordance
with the Vegich analysis of the RCIA. Contrary to the court's assertions,
however, the General Assembly's purpose behind the SWA is unclear and
may be undeterminable. 14' Because of the uncertainty over the General
Assembly's intent, to determine whether comparative negligence should apply
to SWA actions judicial construction of the SWA should be scrutinized. As
will be shown, judicial construction has gradually converted the SWA into
a strict liability statute. Therefore, the Simmons court should have examined
the Coney v. J.L.G. Industries'42 decision-a strict liability case-to deter-
mine whether the comparative negligence doctrine should apply to SWA
actions.
In Vegich, a passenger and a driver were injured in a car accident; both
parties sued the contractor in charge of repairing a state highway, 43 alleging
that the defendants had violated the RCIA.'" The trial court dismissed their
complaints because they failed to plead that they were free from contributory
negligence. 4 In addition, the trial court ruled that they were contributorily
negligent as a matter of law.'" The appellate court reversed the trial court's
decsion and remanded,' 47 and the supreme court affirmed the appellate
court.'"
that the SWA must be construed liberally so as to effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. at 459,
473 N.E.2d at 953 (citing Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 5 II1. 2d 121, 302 N.E.2d
64 (1973)). Sachs' final contention was that Simmons was a foreman and therefore liable under
the SWA to Sachs. The court rejected this argument, holding that the SWA did not impose
liability on a foreman who was also the injured party. 104 I11. 2d at 461-62, 473 N.E.2d at
954.
141. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
142. 97 Il. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
143. 104 I1. 2d at 464, 419 N.E.2d at 919. Kawolsky, the driver, was killed in the accident.
His widow brought an action under the RCIA.
144. The civil action clause reads in pertinent part:
Any contractor ... who knowingly and wilfully violates any provision of this Act,
shall be responsible for any injury to person or property occasioned by such
violation, and a right of action shall accrue to any person injured for any damages
sustained thereby ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 314.6 (1983).
145. 64 Il1. 2d at 464, 419 N.E.2d at 919.
146. Id. Apparently, Kawolsky and Vegich had been drinking in a bar for several hours
before the accident.
147. 84 I1. App. 3d 354, 405 N.E.2d 859 (3d Dist. 1980).
148. 84 Ill. 2d 461, 419 N.E.2d 918 (1981).
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The Vegich court looked to the General Assembly's purpose in passing
the RCIA to determine whether applying contributory negligence would
defeat that purpose. 4 9 The court determined that because the RCIA was a
safety statute and had wilfulness as the standard of liability, the General
Assembly did not intend for contributory negligence to be a defense to RCIA
actions. 150 The court also drew analogies to other statutes that included
wilfulness as the standard of liability:' 5' the Coal Mining Safety Act, 5 2 the
Child Labor Law,' and the Structural Work Act. 54 Since contributory
negligence was not a defense to those statutes, the Vegich court reasoned
that the defense was also not available in RCIA actions.'"
The Simmons court's use of the Vegich holding is flawed in two ways.
First, Vegich was decided before the court adopted comparative negligence
in Alvis v. Ribar.' 6 Prior to the Alvis decision, contributory negligence
operated as a complete bar to a plaintiff's action. The Vegich court concluded
that allowing a plaintiff's conduct to act as a total bar would defeat the
purpose of the RCIA. For the same reason, Illinois courts refused to allow
contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability actions'" or actions
under the SWA. 58 However, with Illinois' adoption of pure comparative
negligence,, this fear was alleviated; the plaintiff's conduct no longer totally
barred an action against a liable defendant. The Coney court reasoned that
application of the comparative negligence doctrine to strict liability cases still
allowed plaintiffs to recover some damages, and that the doctrine was
therefore consistent with the cost-shifting philosophy of strict liability.
159
Accordingly, because comparative negligence is a doctrine distinct from
contributory negligence, the reasoning of the Vegich case is not relevant to
the issue concerning the application of comparative negligence. Therefore,
the Simmons court should not have followed the Vegich decision.
The second problem with the supreme court's reliance on the Vegich
decision is that the Vegich court itself relied on analogies to the SWA to
construe the RCIA. After the Vegich court decided that the RCIA and the
149. The supreme court observed that the RCIA did not mention contributory negligence.
Id. at 464, 419 N.E.2d at 919.
150. Id. at 465, 419 N.E.2d at 919.
151. Id. at 465-66, 419 N.E.2d at 919-20.
152. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 96 1/2, § 1007 (1983).
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 31.19 (1983).
154. Id. §§ 60-69.
155. 84 Il. 2d at 466-67, 419 N.E.2d at 920. The court rejected McDougal's contention that
violations of the RCIA are analoguous to violations of the Public Utilities Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 11 2/3, § 77 (1983), which allows contributory negligence. The court noted that the Public
Utilities Act does not limit liability to wilful acts, but instead grants a cause of action for any
violation. Therefore, the court concluded that the statutes that used a wilful standard were
controlling. 84 Ill. 2d at 467-68, 419 N.E.2d at 920-21.
156. 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
159. 97 I1. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983). See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
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SWA served similar purposes, it reasoned that, because contributory negli-
gence was not allowed under the SWA,' 60 it should not be allowed under
the RCIA. 16' By relying on the Vegich case, the Simmons court engaged in
circular logic: no contributory negligence under the SWA led to no contrib-
utory negligence under the RCIA, which then led to no comparative negli-
gence under the SWA. The Simmons court should not have rested its decision
on an analogy to the Vegich case.
If any analogy was in order, the Simmons court should have analogized
to statutory actions that are similar to the SWA, in which the applicability
of comparative negligence had been addressed.' 62 For example, the court
could have looked to the RCIA to determine whether comparative negligence
applied, and then analogized the result to the SWA. However, because the
court has not addressed these issues, 163 it would not be useful to draw
analogies to the RCIA. The court has also not determined whether compar-
ative negligence applies to other remedial statutes. To determine the ap-
plicability of comparative negligence, the Simmons court should have ex-
amined the SWA itself.
There are two alternative analyses that could be used to determine whether
the comparative negligence doctrine should apply to SWA actions. First, the
language of the SWA could be examined to determine whether the General
Assembly intended for comparative negligence to apply. Second, the SWA
and the doctrine of comparative negligence could have been examined to-
gether, as the Coney court compared strict liability and comparative fault,
to determine the applicability of comparative negligence in reducing damages
in SWA cases. This second approach is preferable because it is more in
accordance with the supreme court's approach in the Alvis and Coney
decisions.
Both analyses require a thorough examination of the statute. The SWA
itself is silent regarding whether any defenses are available to SWA defen-
dants. Thus, the General Assembly's purpose behind the statute should be
examined to determine what, if any, defenses the legislature intended to
allow.
Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co.'" is the leading case that interprets the
purpose underlying the SWA. All courts that have considered the SWA's
purpose have either relied on the Schultz decision or on subsequent cases
that used Schultz as precedent. 65 As the Schultz court stated, "[tihe object
160. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
161. 84 Ill. 2d at 466-67, 419 N.E.2d at 920.
162. The supreme court has not yet ruled on the applicability of comparative negligence to
other similar statutes.
163. Although the RCIA was not at issue in Simmons, the impact of the Simmons case on
the RCIA can be predicted. Since the court analogized to the RCIA, it would probably use the
Simmons case as precedent in future cases concerning the RCIA. Thus, for all practical purposes,
comparative negligence is not a defense to actions brought under the RCIA.
164. 264 III. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914); see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Bounougias v. Republic Steel Corp., 277 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1960) (relying on
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to be attained by this statute was to prevent injuries to persons employed in
this dangerous and extra hazardous occupation, so that negligence on their
part in the manner of doing their work might not prove fatal."'' 66 However,
the court gave no authority for this statement; the court cited nothing from
the legislative record. Rather, the Schultz court analogized to the Mining
Act of 1899.167
The Schultz court's reliance on previous Mining Act decisions is unsound.
Although the Mining Act of 1899 included language on liability identical to
the language used in the SWA civil action clause, 6 the background and
legislative history of the Mining Act is quite different from the SWA. The
Mining Act was passed because the Illinois Constitution required the General
Assembly to pass laws protecting miners.' 69 Thus, the legislative intent is
clearly seen by examining both the history of the Mining Act and the
Schultz); Beebe v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 43 (3d Dist. 1977) (relying on
Palier); Burgh v. Crane Constr. Co., 102 11. App. 2d 188 (Ist Dist. 1968) (relying on Bounougias);
Brackett v. Osborne, 44 Il1. App. 2d 441 (2d Dist. 1963) (relying on Schultz).
Another line of cases rests on an earlier case, Claffy v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 249 Ill.
210, 94 N.E. 551 (1911), for authority regarding the SWA's purpose. In Claffy, the widow of
a plumber who was killed when he fell through an elevator opening sued a building contractor
under the SWA. Mrs. Claffy alleged that the contractor had violated § 66 of the SWA, which
set out requirements for enclosing openings to hoists and elevators. Id. at 214, 94 N.E. at 552.
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of § 66, on the ground that it singled out
elevators and hoists used in the construction of buildings, but not in the alteration, repair, or
destruction of buildings. The court rejected this argument. The court examined the SWA and
concluded that the legislature intended for § 66 to cover all elevators and hoists; the section
was therefore constitutional. Id. at 220, 94 N.E. at 553-54.
Other courts have relied on Claffy as authority for the purpose of the SWA. Yet, the Claffy
court actually only decided what the purpose of § 66 was. See, e.g., Gannon v. Chicago, M.
St. P. & Pac. Ry., 22 Il1. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961) (relying on Claffy); Kennerly v. Shell
Oil Co., 13 Ill. 2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958) (relying on Claffy and Griffiths); John Griffiths
& Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Il. 331, 141 N.E. 739 (1923) (relying on Claffy);
Kobus v. Formfit Co., 56 Il. App. 2d 449, 206 N.E.2d 477 (lst Dist. 1965) (relying on Gannon
and Caffy). But see Kennerly, 13 Ill. 2d at 441, 150 N.E.2d at 140 (Klingbiel, J., dissenting)
(criticizing widespread misconstruction of Claffy).
166. 264 Ill. at 164, 106 N.E. at 239.
167. Id.
168. The Mining Act reads in pertinent part:
For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any willful violations of this
act, or willful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall
accrue to the party injured for any direct damages sustained thereby.
Act of April 18, 1899, § 33, 1899 Ill. Laws 300, 325.
169. The relevant provision in the Illinois Constitution states:
It shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass such laws as may be necessary
for the protection of operative miners, by providing for ventilation, when the same
may be required, and the construction of escapement-shafts, or such other appliances
as may secure safety in all coal mines, and to provide for the enforcement of said
laws by such penalties and punishments, as may be deemed proper.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 29. See E. BECKER, A HISTORY OF ILLINOIS LABOR LEGISLATION
290-91 (1920) (discussing the history of the constitutional provision). The Mining Act of 1899
was a revision and consolidation of various mining laws that had been enacted in the previous
27 years. Id. at 294-95.
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constitutional debates. The SWA lacks such clear statements regarding its
purpose. Therefore, the court erred by applying the construction of the
Mining Act to the SWA. 70
Unfortunately, there is no independent expression of the General Assem-
bly's intent in enacting the SWA other than the Schultz court's assertion.' 7'
Also, there is no other indication as to whether the General Assembly
intended for any defenses to be available for SWA defendants. The supreme
court, however, has held consistently that contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk were not defenses in SWA actions.' 72 Those holdings are
based on the same passage in Schultz that set forth the purpose of the
SWA. 173 Again, the court gave no authority for this statement. 74 In addition,
the Schultz court's statement about the effect of employee negligence on
damages under the SWA is dicta. The defendant in Schultz did not argue
that Schultz' conduct should bar his recovery.' 75 In spite of this, the Schultz
court's statement on the law has been followed faithfully. 76
While the authority of Schultz is doubtful, it is unquestionably the rule
in Illinois that assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not
defenses to SWA actions. Even if such a rule were founded on solid
precedent, it would not assist in the examination of whether comparative
negligence should apply to SWA actions. However, the Simmons court
effectively followed this approach when it relied on Vegich to deprive SWA
defendants of recourse to comparative negligence. This approach is contrary
to the authority of the Alvis and Coney cases, 77 and it should not have been
used to determine the applicability of comparative negligence to any tort.
Thus, an examination of the SWA does not provide guidance as to whether
comparative negligence should apply to assess damages. The statute and
legislative history are silent about which defenses may be used in SWA
actions. Also, the case law concerning the applicability of common law tort
170. The Schultz court also noted that the wording of the SWA was mandatory. The court
inferred that the statutory language mandated a construction of wilful violation to mean knowing
violation. 264 Ill. at 164-65, 106 N.E.2d at 239-40.
171. One commentator suggested that, as a practical matter, the Worker's Compensation
Act superceded the SWA. Krause, Statutory Torts in Illinois, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 5-6 (1967);
see also Comment, supra note 36, at 504 (arguing that the SWA has evolved beyond the intent
of legislature).
172. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
173. The court construed the SWA as follows: "The object to be attained by this statute
was to prevent injuries to persons employed in this dangerous and extra hazardous occupation,
so that negligence on their part in the manner of doing their work might not prove fatal." 264
11. at 164, 106 N.E. at 239.
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
175. The supreme court listed the issues for review in Schultz. The effect of the plaintiff's
conduct was not one of the issues, and apparently was not raised by the defendant. Id. at 157-
58, 106 N.E. at 237.
176. For example, in the Gannon opinion the Court declared that "it was held [in Schultz],
therefore, that the doctrine of assumed risk and contributory negligence had no application to
the [SWA]." 22 III. 2d at 318, 175 N.E.2d at 792 (emphasis added).
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defenses in SWA cases rests on questionable authority. Even if such authority
were persuasive, it is not relevant to the issue of whether comparative
negligence applies to the SWA.
The Coney court proposed a much better method for determining whether
comparative fault should apply to particular strict liability causes of action.
Under the Coney approach, a court decides whether the application of
comparative negligence would frustrate the policy behind the cause of action.
In Simmons, the court either should have looked to the General Assembly's
intent behind the SWA, or analogized to other, similar tort actions in which
the applicability of comparative negligence has been applied. Because the
court declared that "[tihe object to be attained by this statute was to prevent
injuries to persons employed in this dangerous and extra hazardous occu-
pation,"' 7 1 the issue should have been whether applying comparative negli-
gence would make the occupation less safe.
The doctrine of comparative negligence is not inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the SWA. If comparative negligence applied, owners, contractors,
and other persons in charge of construction sites would still have an incentive
to ensure that scaffolds, ladders, and other covered devices are safe. If a
worker was injured solely through the worker's own fault, then the worker's
recovery should and would in fact be denied. 7 9 However, if a scaffold was
unsafe, the owner, contractor, or other person in charge would be liable for
the worker's injuries regardless of the worker's conduct. Comparative neg-
ligence would only reduce damages by the amount that the plaintiff's conduct
contributed to the injury. Thus, when a worker exercises reasonable care,
the owner, contractor, or other person in charge remains liable for the full
amount of damages.
It could be argued that allowing comparative negligence might reduce the
degree of safety at construction sites, presumably because owners, contrac-
tors, and other persons in charge would take no precautions to make sites
safer and instead rely on comparative negligence to relieve them of some
liability. A similar concern was raised and addressed in Coney. 0 The Coney
court declared that a consumer's "unobservant, inattentive, ignorant or
awkward failure to discover or guard against [an unsafe condition] should
not be compared as a damage reducing factor."'' 1 This same limitation
177. See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
178. 264 i1. at 164, 106 N.E. at 239. The Schultz court-viewed the statute as a preventative
statute, not as a compensatory or punitive statute. The WCA is a typical compensatory statute.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-.30 (1983). The Dram Shop Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §
135 (1983), was originally considered to be a penal statute. See Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231,
239, 20 N.E. 73, 77 (1889). However, the Dram Shop Act is now treated as a remedial statute.
See Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 175, 182
(1958).
179. See, e.g., Beebe v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 45 I11. App. 3d 42, 358 N.E.2d 1343
(3d Dist. 1977) (upholding jury verdict for defendant when plaintiff's conduct was sole cause
of injury). See also Comment, supra note 36, at 504.
180. 97 III. 2d at 110, 454 N.E.2d at 201.
181. Id. at 118, 454 N.E.2d at 204.
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should be applied to comparative negligence in SWA actions. Only the
injured party's affirmative misconduct that contributes to his injury should
be balanced against the defendant's liability.' 82 A worker's mere failure to
notice a dangerous condition would not reduce an injured worker's recovery.
However, when a worker's actions amount to misconduct and the actions
contribute to the worker's injury, then the recovery would be reduced by
the portion of the damages associated with the misconduct." 3 In contrast,
defendants would not be able to rely on a slight amount of worker negligence
to relieve them of part of their liability. Thus, application of comparative
negligence to SWA actions would not defeat the General Assembly's purpose
behind the SWA.
An examination of the Illinois Supreme Court's construction of the SWA
also supports the conclusion that comparative negligence should apply in
actions under the SWA. The effect of the court's interpretation of the statute
converts the SWA into a strict liability statute. Therefore, for the same
reasons that comparative negligence applies to strict liability actions, the
doctrine should apply to SWA actions.
Although the SWA creates a cause of action only for "wilful violations,"
the Schultz court defined the "wilful violation" requirement broadly.' 4 The
defendant's mere knowledge that a scaffold or similar device is used at an
employer's site constitutes a wilful violation by the defendant if the scaffold
turns out to be unsafe. 85 This construction has turned the SWA into a strict
182. Id. at 119, 454 N.E.2d at 204.
183. Smith v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 86 Il. App. 3d 570, 408 N.E.2d 117 (3d Dist. 1980),
provides an excellent example of behavior that may be categorized as misconduct. In Smith,
the plaintiff, a painter, was injured when he "jumped" the ladder on which he was working
so that he could paint the section under the ladder. Id. at 572, 408 N.E.2d at 119. After the
jury could not reach a verdict, the trial court entered directed verdicts for the defendants. Id.
The appellate court reversed, holding that there was evidence that a wilful violation of the
SWA caused the accident. Id. at 573-74, 408 N.E.2d at 120. Therefore, the decision of whether
the plaintiff's conduct was the sole cause of the injury was a question for the jury, and the
trial court consequently abused its discretion when it directed verdicts. See.also Lindsey v. Dean
Evans Co., I 1 111. App. 3d 432, 297 N.E.2d 8 (4th Dist. 1973) (negligence by plaintiff in moving
scaffold not relevent if defendant wilfully violated SWA).
If comparative negligence had been used in Smith, the hung jury might have been avoided.
The jury could have found that the plaintiff's negligence was not the sole cause of the injury,
but a contributing cause that should diminish his recovery. Thus, the injustice of either ignoring
plaintiff's conduct or ignoring the defendant's violation of the SWA is avoided.
184. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
185. See. e.g., Banwart v. Okesson, 83 Il. App. 3d 222, 403 N.E.2d 1234 (2d Dist. 1980)
(fact that owner knew scaffold was used and gave instructions regarding placement sufficient
to find wilful violation); Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57 Il1. App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354
(Ist Dist. 1978) (fact that owner knew crane was near power line sufficient to support finding
of wilful violation); Jackson v. H.J. Frierdich & Sons, Inc., 1 111. App. 3d 381, 274 N.E.2d
189 (5th Dist. 1971) (when defendant was in charge of erecting scaffolding, plaintiff's testimony
that plank slipped sufficient to find a wilful violation).
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liability statute.'8 6 Injured workers'87 may file SWA claims if (1) they were
engaged in an occupation covered by the statute and they were injured while
working on scaffolding or other covered devices, 88 (2) the defendants were
in charge of the structure,' 9 (3) the defendants knew that a covered device
was being used and knew of or could have discovered the dangerous con-
dition,' 90 and (4) the worker's injuries were caused by the dangerous condition
of the device.' 9' When a plaintiff has been injured, juries tend to find the
existence of a dangerous condition even in the absence of direct evidence.192
The requirements under the SWA are analogous to the elements for a
successful strict products liability suit.
186. See Barthel v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 74 Ill. 2d 213, 384 N.E.2d 323 (1978). In
Barthel, the Illinois Supreme Court stated, "[tlhe courts have found a legislative intent to
impose strict liability in several Illinois statutes, such as . . . the Structural Work Act." Id. at
220, 384 N.E.2d at 327. Several commentators have also noted that the SWA has become a
strict liability statute. See, e.g., Maher, The Construction Injuries Act: Another Structural
Work Act and Possibly More, 70 ILL. B.J. 388, 391 (1981) (discussing Vegich and noting that
both the RCIA and SWA are strict liability statutes); Note, supra note 37, at 410 (SWA imposes
"virtually absolute liability"); C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 724
(2d ed. 1969) (SWA imposes strict liability on owner who knows scaffolding will be used).
187. Workers constitute the majority of plaintiffs under the SWA. However, other persons
also have standing to sue under the SWA. See, e.g., Quinn v. L.B.C. Inc., 94 I1. App. 3d
660, 418 N.E.2d 1011 (1st Dist. 1981) (allowing city inspector to recover under SWA); Bennett
v. Musgrave, 130 Ill. App. 2d 891, 261 N.E.2d 128 (5th Dist. 1970) (invitee of defendant owner
was protected person under SWA). But see Grant v. Zale Constr. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 545,
440 N.E.2d 1043 (1st Dist. 1982) (firefighter injured while rescuing construction worker not
covered by SWA).
188. Plaintiffs not working on a structure must show that a structure and activity covered
by the SWA were involved. See, e.g., Long v. City of New Boston, 91 11. 2d 456, 440 N.E.2d
625 (1982) (volunteer worker hanging Christmas lights was engaged in alteration of structure);
Grant v. Zale Constr. Co., 109 Il. App. 3d 545, 440 N.E.2d 1043 (1st Dist. 1982) (firefighter
not engaged in covered activity).
189. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
190. The defendant's mere knowledge of the use of scaffolding constitutes a wilful violation
of the SWA. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
191. To defend against an SWA claim, a defendant can introduce evidence that the injury
was caused by the plaintiff's conduct. Although contributory negligence is not a defense, the
plaintiff cannot recover if the plaintiff's conduct was the sole cause of the accident. See Kochan
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 123 Il. App. 3d 844, 463 N.E.2d 921 (1st Dist. 1984); Smith
v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 86 Ill. App. 3d 570, 408 N.E.2d 117 (3d Dist. 1980); Beebe v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 45 Il. App. 3d 43, 358 N.E.2d 1343 (3d Dist. 1977).
Other commentators have listed a different set of requirements for a SWA action. One
commentator suggested the following elements: (1) the device must be one covered by the act;(2) the device must be used in the erection or alteration of a building; (3) the device must be
unsafe; (4) there must be a wilful violation; and (5) the violation must be the proximate cause
of the injury. Comment, supra note 36, at 503; see also Ring, supra note 32, at 670. However,
these requirements differ only facially from those set out in the text above, which combine the
technical requirements with the case law interpreting the SWA.
192. Courts tend to employ reasoning analogous to that used in res ipsa loquitor, under
which the occurrence of an accident proves the existence of a dangerous condition. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. H.J. Frierdich & Sons, Inc., 1 Ill. App. 3d 381, 274 N.E.2d 189 (5th Dist. 1971)
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To succeed in a strict product liability action, the plaintiff must prove
that the injury was caused by a product that was sold or manufactured by
the defendant, and that was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
when it left the defendant's control.' 93 Thus, both SWA actions and strict
liability suits require: (1) that a specific item be involved; (2) that the
defendants exercise some control of the item; (3) that the item be dangerous;
and (4) that the dangerous condition contribute to the plaintiff's injury.
Therefore, it is correct to assert that the SWA is presently construed as a
strict liability statute.
In addition to having a similar set of requirements, the cause of action
created by the SWA is similar in purpose to the strict products liability
doctrine proposed in section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. The
purpose of the SWA is to protect workers from unsafe work conditions by
placing the legal burden of employee safety on owners, contractors, or other
persons in charge of the work. 194 These parties are in the best position to
provide for the worker's safety, and they are best able to bear the costs of
injuries that occur.'"1 This is the same rationale given in support of section
402A. 9 Because the Illinois Supreme Court has effectively turned the SWA
into a strict liability statute, the rules that apply to strict liability actions
should also logically apply to SWA actions. Also, the effect of the doctrine
on the plaintiff's burden is the same because both reduce the proof problems
previously encountered. 97 Therefore, because the court applied comparative
principles to strict liability in Coney, it would have been sensible for the
court to have applied those same principles to the SWA.
Had the defendant Sachs been allowed to raise comparative negligence in
the Simmons case, the result would probably have been the same. The
employee's only conduct that arguably contributed to his injury was his
failure to discover the oil on the ladder. However, this is precisely the type
of conduct that the Coney court decided should not be compared and used
to mitigate damages. Only if the defendant had engaged in affirmative
.misconduct, such as jostling the ladder' 9 or drinking excessively on the
job,'9 would the defendant's negligence have been used to mitigate damages.
(plaintiff's testimony that scaffold board slipped alone sufficient to find defect in scaffold).
193. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Il1. 2d 104, 109, 454 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1983); Suvada
v. White Motors, 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1966).
194. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
195. See Comment, supra note 36, at 517-18.
196. Suvada v. White Motors, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
197. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 183.
199. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978) (driver's intoxication was proper factor to consider in applying comparative negligence
to strict liability).
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V. IMPACT OF THE SIMMONS DECISION
The supreme court's analysis in Simmons creates uncertainty about when
the doctrine of comparative negligence should be applied in future cases. It
has not yet been determined whether comparative negligence applies in several
areas of tort law-particularly worker's compensation and nuisance actions.
Prior to Simmons, lower courts presented with these issues could proceed
under a Coney type of analysis and be confident that the Illinois Supreme
Court would affirm their reasoning. After Simmons, however, lower courts
are presented with conflicting methode by which to analyze comparative
fault; there is no guidance as to whether the Coney or Simmons analysis
should be followed.
Under the Illinois Worker's Compensation Act (WCA), an injured worker
can recover damages from an employer for any "injuries arising out of and
in the course of employment." Contributory negligence has never been a
defense to actions under the WCA ° because the right to recover is not
based on the negligence or fault of either the employer or employee. 201 Not
to apply contributory negligence to worker's compensation is consistent with
the purpose of the WCA, which is to provide financial protection for
employees in the event of disability. 2 2 The Illinois Supreme Court has not
addressed whether comparative negligence should apply to WCA actions.
Under the analysis used in Coney, the policies of the WCA would be
examined to determine whether comparative negligence defeats those policies.
Unlike the SWA and strict products liability, the WCA is an insurance act.20 3
According to this analysis, the conduct of the injured party should not be
a factor in awarding compensation because application of comparative fault
principles in such cases would defeat the purpose of the WCA. If the analysis
in Simmons were used to determine whether comparative negligence should
apply to the WCA, then the decision is easier to reach: because contributory
negligence was not a defense to liability under the WCA, comparative
negligence should not used to reduce the injured employee's recovery. Thus,
under either analysis, comparative negligence would not apply to WCA
actions.
200. Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 III. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976); Imperial
Brass Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 306 III. 11, 137 N.E. 411 (1922).
201. This characteristic of the WCA was noted by the supreme court: "[U]nder the Work-
men's Compensation Act the right to compensation exists without reference to the fault of the
employer or the care of the employee." Imperial Brass Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 306
Ill. 11, 14, 137 N.E. 411, 412 (1922).
202. Laffon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill. 2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1977); Board of
Educ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 IlI. 2d 167, 290 N.E.2d 247 (1972).
203. Strict liability appears to make the manufacturer an insurer of the product. However,
the supreme court has made it clear that this interpretation of strict products liability is incorrect.
The court stated that "imposition of strict liability was not meant to make the manufacturer
an absolute insurer." Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 I1I. 2d 104, 110, 454 N.E.2d 197, 200
(1983). If the court were to change its position on the effect of strict liability on products
liability, it also would have to reconsider the Coney decision.
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Private nuisance actions, like WCA actions, are not based on the negligence
of the parties. A private nuisance is an intentional interference with another's
land that results in an unreasonable and substantial interference with the use
or enjoyment of that land.2°0 In Illinois nuisance actions, the negligence of
parties is not an element of liability. 20 1 Also, Illinois does not recognize the
defense of coming to the nuisance, which bars actions by new residents
against ongoing activity. 206 If the Simmons approach were used to determine
whether a plaintiff's coming to the nuisance, a concept related to comparative
negligence, should reduce damages, -omparative negligence would not apply
because contributory negligence has never historically been applied. If the
Coney analysis were used, then the historical purpose behind allowing actions
for nuisance would be assessed. Nuisance damage actions are designed to
protect a plaintiff's enjoyment of property rights. 0 7 This purpose would then
be examined to determine whether it is consistent with comparative negli-
gence.
The Simmons opinion indicates that the supreme court might reconsider
its decisions in Alvis and Coney. In Coney, the Illinois Supreme Court
aligned itself with those progressive courts that applied comparative ncgli-
gence broadly, in defiance of older, contrary decisions. Because the supreme
court interpreted Coney narrowly in the Simmons case, the court may be in
the process of limiting the Coney holding to a narrow doctrine of damage
mitigation in only extreme cases. 20
204. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 87.
205. "Ordinarily neither the negligence of the defendant nor the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff is involved in an action with respect to nuisance." Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co.
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d 544, 548, 216 N.E.2d 788, 791 (1966).
206. See, e.g., Menolascino v. Superior Felt & Bedding Co., 313 Il. App. 557, 40 N.E.2d
813 (Ist Dist. 1942) (fact that defendant was operating business prior to plaintiff moving to
premises does not relieve defendant of liability). Some states have held that a plaintiff's
willingness to move ("come") to the site of a nuisance will serve to relieve the defendant of
some or all liability. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 88B.
207. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 91, § 87.
208. The Illinois Supreme Court's recent decision in Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 108
Ill. 2d 146, 483 N.E.2d I (1985). further supports the notion that the court is retreating from
its Coney position. In Simpson, the plaintiff's decedent was killed while driving an earth scraper
manufactured by General Motors (GM). Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 118 III. App. 3d
479, 480, 455 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ist Dist. 1983). The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
based on strict liability against GM and the distributor of the scraper. Id. GM raised assumption
of risk and contributory negligence as defenses. The trial court ruled that both defenses were
improper and refused to give a jury instruction offered by GM on those defenses. Id. Instead,
the trial court gave the jury two special interrogatories. The first asked whether the decedent
was guilty of assumption of the risk. Id. The second interrogatory asked the jury to allocate
the fault of the parties if the first interrogatory was answered affirmatively:
Assuming that 100% represents the combined fault of the plaintiff's decedent and
of the defendant that contributed as a proximate cause of plaintiff's decedent's
death, what proportion of such combined fault is attributable to the plaintiff's
decedent on the one hand and what proportion is attributable to the defendant on
the other hand?
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The Simmons decision may also have the effect of prompting the General
Assembly to take action. Several bills have been introduced in the General
Assembly that would reform the SWA. Two of these bills would repeal the
SWA outright.20 9 Although repeal has been attempted in previous years, the
Simmons decision may prompt formerly neutral legislators to reevaluate the
SWA as it has been judicially construed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Another bill would codify the Simmons decision by adding a section to the
Answer: 'to plaintiff' _%
'to defendant' _ %
Id. at 481, 455 N.E.2d at 139. The jury responded by attributing 5% of the total fault to the
decedent. Therefore, the trial court reduced the total verdict by 5%. Id.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that after the Coney
decision, assumption of risk and misuse of product were no longer total bars to recovery. Id.
at 481, 455 N.E.2d at 139-40.
GM appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. GM argued that the trial court improperly
limited consideration of the plaintiff's conduct to assumption of risk and misuse of product
and failed to consider the plaintiff's contributory negligence, defined as the "lack of due care
for one's own safety as measured by the objective reasonable-man standard," 108 Ill. 2d at
150, 483 N.E.2d at 2-3, should not be considered in a strict liability case. Id. at 152, 483
N.E.2d at 4.
See also Pell v. Victor J. Andrew High School, 123 Il1. App. 3d 423, 462 N.E.2d 858 (1st
Dist. 1984). In Pell, the appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to give a comparative
negligence instruction. Id. at 432, 462 N.E.2d at 865. The appellate court interpreted Coney as
holding that assumption of risk and misuse of product were no longer total bars to recovery.
Id. at 431, 462 N.E.2d at 865. Rather, when a plaintiff's conduct rises to the level of assumption
of risk or misuse of product, then that conduct will be compared with the defendant's fault
and reduce damages. However, "ordinary contributory negligence" will not operate to reduce
damages. Id. at 432, 462 N.E.2d at 865. This is a narrow reading of Coney. In Coney the
supreme court noted the statement in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d
305 (1970), that "contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely of a failure to discover the defect in the product or to guard against the
possibility of its existence." 97 III. 2d at 114, 454 N.E.2d at 203-04. The Coney court adopted
this statement, noting that a "consumer's unobservant, inattentive, ignorant, or awkward failure
to discover or guard against a defect should not be compared as a damage-reducing factor."
Id. at 118, 454 N.E.2d at 204. Based on the Coney language, the appellate court concluded
that there are two levels of contributory negligence: conduct that amounts to assumption of
risk or misuse of product, and anything less than such conduct. Conduct of the latter sort is
not compared; unless the defendant can show that plaintiff's conduct reached the level of
assumption of risk or misuse of product, no instruction on comparative negligence should be
given. 123 Ill. App. 3d at 431, 462 N.E.2d at 865.
Coney can also be read to establish three levels of contributory negligence: (I) failure to
discover or guard against a defect; (2) contributory negligence that is not such a failure, but
does not rise to the level of assumption of risk or misuse of product; and (3) conduct that
amounts to assumption of risk or misuse or product. As noted in Coney, negligence of the
first sort should not be compared. However, the other two types of negligence should reduce
damages. See also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976) (failure to
use ordinary care, other than failure to discover or guard against a defect, is a defense in strict
liability actions).
209. S.B. 198, 84th Ii. Gen. Assembly, 1985 Sess. was introduced on Feb. 21, 1985 by
Senator Newhouse. S.B. 250, 84th Ill. Gen Assembly, 1985 Sess. was introduced on Feb. 28,
1985 by Senator Keats.
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SWA that would exclude comparative negligence as a defense °10 A fourth
bill would overrule Simmons and allow the plaintiff's award to be reduced
by the plaintiff's own negligence."' All of these bills have been sent to
committees and no action has yet been taken.
Additional pressure to alter the present status of the SWA will come from
the insurance companies. Several commentators note that the SWA has
caused liability insurance rates for Illinois contractors to rise to the highest
in the nation."' Application of the comparative negligence doctrine to SWA
actions would help reduce the liability insurance burden on contractors.
However, the Simmons decision has temporarily foreclosed any judicial relief
in this area.
CONCLUSION
Since the Illinois Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence, the
court has struggled to determine the situations in which comparative negli-
gence should apply."1 3 The decision in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries Inc. to
extend comparative negligence to strict liability cases suggested that the court
would apply comparative negligence broadly in many tort cases. After a
careful examination of the policies behind comparative negligence and strict
liability, the Coney court determined that the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence applies to strict liability. Thus, it guided the lower courts about how
to determine whether comparative negligence should apply in other settings.
In Simmons v. Union Electric Co., the Illinois Supreme Court held that
comparative negligence did not apply to actions brought under the Illinois
Structural Work Act. The Simmons court examined the status of other
common law defenses to both the SWA and other similar statutes. The court
ignored the analysis that it had previously delineated in Coney v. J.L.G.
Industries Inc. The supreme court concluded that because there was no
defense of contributory negligence under the SWA, there could not be a
defense of comparative negligence. The progressive, modern analysis of
210. H.B. 225, 84th Il. Gen Assembly, 1985 Sess., which was introduced on Feb. 14, 1985
by Representative Curran, would add section 69.1 to the SWA. This section would read:
The doctrine of comparative fault is not applicable to any case arising under this
Act.
Id. § 1.
211. S.B. 127, 84th I1. Gen Assembly, 1985 Sess., which was introduced on Feb. 10, 1985
by Senator Collins, would add a paragraph to the end of section 69, which would read:
However, failure of an employee to use ordinary care for his own safety shall result
in a reduction of damages for the injuries sustained in an amount proportionate to
the percentage of negligence by the employee. Contributory negligence shall not be
a bar to recovery of damages as established in the Act.
Id. § 1.
212. See Comment, supra note 38 at 520; Note, supra note 38, at 410.
213. Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Il. 2d 461, N.E.2d 382 (1984); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,
97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
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Coney was forsaken. If the Simmons court had applied the Coney approach,
it would most likely have concluded that comparative negligence should
apply to the SWA. When it did not apply the Coney analysis, the court
reached a decision that creates uncertainty about the future of comparative
negligence in Illinois.
Andrew M. Gardner

